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I consider a model in which an asset owner must decide how much to invest in his asset 
mindful of the fact that an encroacher’s valuation of the asset is increasing in the asset 
owner’s investment. Due to incomplete property rights, the encroacher and asset owner 
engage in a contest over the control of the asset after investment has taken place. A standard 
result is that the asset owner will underinvest in the asset relative to the first-best level of 
investment when property rights are complete. Contrary to this standard result, I find that 
when the interaction between the asset owner and the encroacher is infinitely repeated and the 
encroacher has some bargaining power over the size of the transfer from the asset owner to 
him, then there is a cooperative equilibrium in which the asset owner finds it optimal to over-
invest in the asset when property rights are incomplete relative to the first-best level of 
investment when property rights are complete. Overinvestment is used to induce cooperation. 
However, this result depends on the encroacher’s bargaining power or, more generally, 
whether the transfer is an increasing function of investment. 
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1. Introduction 
   
  It is widely accepted that the level of investment and creation of surplus in a 
country or by individuals in their assets depends on the security of property rights. 
Property rights affect economic performance. In recent years, this view has been 
forcefully expoused in De Soto (2000, 2001). De Soto (2001) argues that “[W]hat the 
poor lack is the easy access to the property mechanisms that could legally fix the 
economic potential of their assets, so that they could be used to produce, secure, or 
guarantee greater value in the expanded market … assets need a formal property system 
to produce significant surplus value.” 
To be sure, De Soto (2000, 2001) focuses on formal, legal, and direct protection 
of property rights of the kind provided by the state. However, since the protection of 
protection rights is costly, it is unlikely that the state can provide complete property 
rights. In a world of such incomplete property rights, individuals and private agents also 
invest in property rights protection. And the state cannot fully protect property rights 
through direct enforcement. Therefore, even if private agents or the state take actions to 
protect their property rights, these actions need not be only direct investments in fighting 
those who challenge their property rights.  For example, Allen (2002), drawing on the 
insights of Demsetz (1967), shows that an asset owner might have the incentive to reduce 
the value of his asset in order to make the asset less attractive to encroachers. In 
particular, the asset owner might destroy attributes of the asset which are valued by the 
encroacher but not valued by owner or are valued less highly by him (i.e., the owner). 
Allen (2002) presents many interesting examples to illustrate his point.  For example, he 
argues that Rhinoceros in Africa and elsewhere are dehorned to reduce their value to   2 
poachers. Also, he argues that Monsato, the American seed company, purchased the 
“terminator gene” to make its plants sterile (unable to germinate) in order to reduce the 
value of its seed to seed pirates. He also applies this simple idea to penal colonies, the 
quality of office furniture in public buildings, toilet paper and soap dispensers in public 
washrooms, the quality of children’s skis, snowboards, bikes, and other interesting 
phenomena. Konrad (2002) also finds that incomplete property rights lead to 
underinvestment or cannot lead to overinvestment. He applies his analysis to investments 
by managers within firms and by autocrats within countries.
1 In a similar but more 
elaborate model, Gonzalez (2005) also finds that when property rights are incomplete, it 
may be optimal to adopt inferior technologies even if a superior technology is costless.
2
Clearly, in Allen (2002), Konrad (2002), Gonzalez (2005) and Goldstein and 
Udry (2008), a lower investment is used as a deterrent to encroachers and so 
overinvestment is not possible. For example, in Gonzalez (2005) there are two 
technologies: an existing but inferior technology and a superior technology which can be 
adopted at zero cost. If property rights are complete, the first-best solution will be the 
adoption of the superior technology. Since there are only two technologies, the second-
best environment of incomplete property rights cannot lead to the adoption of a better 
 
Finally, there is an empirical literature that shows that weaker protection of protection 
rights lead to lower investment (e.g., see Besley, 1995; Goldstein and Udry, 2008, and the 
references therein). 
                                                 
1More importantly, Konrad (2002) examines how the advantages of incumbency affect the investment 
incentives of the incumbent. 
2In a growth model with incomplete property rights, Gonzalez (2007) and Gonzalez and Neary (2008)  
show that it may be optimal to reduce the rate of economic growth. This result is in the spirit of Allen 
(2002), Konrad (2002) and Gonzalez (2005) although the analysis is undertaken in a much richer dynamic 
environment.   3 
technology than the one adopted in the first-best case. Therefore, overinvestment is not 
possible.
3
The asset owner may increase the value of the asset for strategic reasons. A higher 
value of the asset could be seen as a commitment device by the owner to credibly 
communicate to the encroacher that he (i.e., the owner) is willingly to spend enough 
resources to protect it. This may cause the encroacher to reduce his effort. Even if the 
higher value causes the encroacher to increase his effort, the owner might still find it 
optimal to increase the value of the asset if the increase in his effort is sufficiently greater 
than the increase in the encroacher’s effort such that his probability of keeping the asset 
or the proportion of it that he appropriates is sufficiently high and the increase in the cost 
of effort required to achieve this outcome is sufficiently low.  
  
While property rights affect investment in assets, investments in an asset can also 
affect property rights. Besley (1995) discusses this endogeneity issue in his econometric 
analysis. The use of investments to enhance property rights is evident in Razzaz’s (1993)  
work on squatters in Jordan. Razzaz (1993, p. 351) notes that the settlers “… know that a 
makeshift shelter stands little chance and that the more they invest in permanent material 
the more their claim to the land is legitimized.” This suggests that if the settlers had 
complete property rights over the land, they would have invested less which is an 
indication of over-investment when property rights incomplete. 
                                                 
3Gonzalez (2005) is, however, not primarily concerned with the comparison of investment levels in first-
best and second-best environments. His focus is a different but interesting question: given a second-best 
world, if an agent can adopt an inferior technology and a superior but costless technology, will he 
necessarily adopt the superior technology?   4 
Although the preceding argument is intuitive and may be a potential reason for 
overinvestment, I find that it is unable to generate overinvestment in both complete 
information and incomplete information environments. I therefore extend the complete-
information case to an infinitely-repeated game setting and find that overinvestment may 
be undertaken because it facilitates cooperation between the asset owner and encroacher. 
In this case, the asset owner makes a transfer to the encroacher in each period and in 
return the encroacher promises not to challenge the property rights of the asset owner. 
However, I show that whether this results in overinvestment whether the transfer is an 
increasing function of investment. It turns out that when the encroacher has some 
bargaining power over the size of the transfers, then the transfer is indeed an increasing 
function of the investment in the asset. The idea that transfers or redistribution can be 
used to induce cooperation, when property rights are incomplete, is not new.
 4
The intuition for the overinvestment result is as follows: given that the transfer is 
increasing in the level of investment, cooperation is easier to sustain when there is 
overinvestment because it is costlier for the encroacher to renege on the agreement and 
suffer the consequence of losing this sufficiently high transfer forever.
 The new 
result here is that the encroacher’s bargaining power or, more generally, the relationship 
between the transfer and investment can lead to overinvestment.  
5
                                                 
4For example, see Amegashie (2008) and the references therein.  
5 In Skaperdas’ (1992) static model in which there is no investment, cooperation is possible to sustain if the 
conflict success technology is sufficiently ineffective. This condition does not hold in my model. 
 This is what 
gives the crucial condition in the model that the critical discount factor must be 
decreasing in the level of investment. Yet, overinvestment will not always sustain 
cooperation because while it is imposes the threat of a relatively high punishment on the   5 
encroacher, it is also makes the one-time gain from deviation relatively high since the 
value of the asset is higher when there is overinvestment compared to when there is no 
overinvestment.
 6
The motivation behind the preceding argument is related to an argument in 
Halonen (2002). In an infinitely-repeated prisoner’s-dilemma type game within a 
Grossman-Hart-Moore framework
  
When the transfer is lump-sum (i.e., independent of investment), overinvestment 
is not optimal because it does not affect the magnitude of the punishment but increases 
the gain from deviation. 
7
My paper is also related to but different from a recent contribution by Robinson 
and Torvik (2005). In their paper, they opine that in the political economy of 
development, the issue of investments with negative social surplus is more important than 
underinvestment. In the case of Ghana under its first president, Kwame Nkrumah, Killick 
 where take-it-or-leave-it transfers are made from one 
party to the another in order to sustain cooperation, Halonen (2002) shows that relative to 
single-ownership, joint-ownership of an asset has the desirable feature of imposing the 
threat of a higher punishment but has the undesirable feature of yielding a higher one-
time gain from deviation.  If the latter effect is sufficiently strong, then joint ownership is 
the optimal ownership structure. However, Halonen (2002) does not obtain the result of 
overinvestment in this paper. 
                                                 
6 Subsidies for activities like R&D financed by taxes can also lead to overinvestment. However, in this case 
there could be overinvestment even if the subsidy was financed by a lump-sum tax. To be sure, the idea that 
subsidies can lead to overinvestment is obvious and such arguments are different from the argument being 
made here. It is not obvious that a distortionary tax can lead to overinvestment. In the present model, it is 
the combination of incomplete property rights and transfers that are similar to distortionary taxes which 
account for overinvestment. 
7 This is the property-rights theory of the firm pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore 
(1990).   6 
(1978, p.207) notes that “[T]he larger volume of ‘investment’ … could not compensate 
for the low-productivity uses to which it was put.” Indeed, as Robinson and Torvik 
(2005, note 2) argue “[T]he problem under Nkrumah was not underinvestment … the 
consensus view is that the capital stock increased by 80% between 1960 and 1965 … The 
problem was in the way this investment was allocated.” Using a model of political 
competition, Robinson and Torvik (2005) argue that such investments with negative 
social surplus (i.e., white elephants) could be seen as a credible promise to redistribute 
income to a segment of the electorate in order to influence the outcomes of elections in a 
world where politicians do not have complete property rights over power. However, my 
model and analysis differ from Robinson and Torvik (2005) in the following respects. 
First, I use a model of contest where efforts in the contest are not pure transfers. Second, 
overinvestment in my model does not lead to negative surplus. While overinvestment 
need not lead to a negative surplus, a negative surplus is an indication of overinvestment. 
My model cannot explain why an agent will invest in a white elephant while Robinson 
and Torvik (2005) cannot explain overinvestment that does not lead to a negative surplus. 
Indeed, while Robinson and Torvik (2005) present a very plausible theory to explain 
white elephants, their theory cannot explain the construction of projects like Ghana’s 
recent multi-million dollar and controversial presidential palace
8
                                                 
8 See a report by BBC on Ghana’s presidential palace at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7720653.stm 
 which was constructed 
in the capital, Accra, an ethnically diverse and metropolitan city in the Greater Accra 
region of the country. It is hard to believe that the NPP government’s goal was to use the 
project to transfer resources to its political supporters given that its strongholds are in the 
Ashanti and Eastern regions of the country. Third, I show that even if investment is used   7 
as a transfer to induce cooperation, whether there is overinvestment depends on the 
nature of transfers.  
The seminal models of entry deterrence by Dixit (1980) and Spence (1977) also 
predict overinvestment. To the extent that an incumbent firm has to overinvest because it 
has incomplete property rights over market power, such models are related to the idea in 
this paper. A difference is that, unlike this paper, the investment undertaken by the 
incumbent firm does not have any positive value to the entrant. Therefore, investment is 
not used to make transfers to the entrant and so does not facilitate cooperation in the 
sense of this paper.  
  The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section considers a 
single-period two-stage model of investment and contest over property rights with 
complete information.
 Section 3 considers an infinitely-repeated version of the model in 
section 2. Section 4 discusses the results and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Investment and property rights 
Consider a variant of the model of investment in the absence of complete property  
rights in Konrad (2002).
 9
                                                 
9 Although the basic model in this section is similar to Konrad (2002), my results and focus in this paper 
differ from his. First, Konrad (2002) restricts his analysis to the case where the asset owner and the 
encroacher have the same valuation of the asset. He introduces asymmetry between the players by giving 
the owner a head-start advantage in his success probability; that is, the owner has some positive probability 
of success even if his effort is zero and the thief exerts a positive effort. Konrad (2002) is primarily 
interested in this head-start advantage as the title of his paper indicates. Second, and most importantly, the 
analyses in section 3 of this paper is different from Konrad (2002). 
 There are two risk-neutral agents, 1 and 2. Agent 1 owns an 
asset (e.g., a piece of land). Agent 2 is an encroacher who derives utility from using the   8 
asset. Let V = V(x) be the value of an asset to the owner when he invests x dollars in the 
asset. Assume that x ≥ 0, V(0) = 0, 
 
′  V (x) > 0and 
 
′  ′  V (x) < 0. Let W = W(x) be the value of 
the asset to the encroacher, where W(0) = 0 and  0 ) x ( W > ′ . Different valuations of the 
asset may be due to different abilities of the agents. For example, suppose when x is 
invested in the asset, it gives an intermediate input, n(x), which is used in a final 
production function fj(n(x)), where V(x) = f1(n(x)) and W(x)= f2(n(x)), j = 1,2. 
 
2.1 Complete property rights 
Consider the benchmark case of complete property rights. In this case, the 
owner’s first-best level of x is  
x* = arg max V(x) – x, 
where x* satisfies 
 
′  V (x*) = 1. 
 
2.2 Incomplete property rights with complete information 
Now consider the case of incomplete property rights. Suppose the owner invests 
e1 dollars in protecting his property and the encroacher invests e2 dollars to challenge the 
property rights of the owner.  







= . Accordingly, the probability that the encroacher will be successful is  
p2 = 1 – p1. This is an all-or-nothing, winner-takes-all contest.  However, we can also 
interpret these probabilities as the proportions of the asset that each person can control or 
use.   9 
  The probability function above is known as the contest success function and the 
particular form used here is referred to as an imperfectly-discriminating contest success 
function because the party with the higher effort does not win with certainty. When the 
party with the higher effort wins with certainty, the contest is perfectly discriminating and 
is referred to as an all-pay auction (e.g., see Konrad, 2009). I return to this distinction in 
section 4. 
  I model the game as a two-stage game. In the first stage the owner chooses x and 
in the second stage, the encroacher and owner choose e1 and e2 simultaneously in a 
complete-information contest. I look for a subgame perfect equilibrium by backward 
induction.  
Working backwards, consider stage 2. In this stage, noting that x is sunk, the 
players’ payoffs are 
U1 = p1V(x) – e1                    (1) 
and   
U2 = p2W(x) – e2                  (2) 
 
The unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium values, after some algebra, are  
= 1 e ˆ   2
2
) W V (
W V
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and  = 2 e ˆ   2
2
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 (see, for example, Nti, 1999; Konrad, 2009). The 
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W
+
> 0. Note that for   10 
any x, 0 <  1 p ˆ  < 1. I suppress the dependence of W and V on x for notational convenience 
whenever necessary. 
  In stage 1, the owner chooses x to maximize  
S1(x) =  2
3
) W V (
V
+
 – x,                  (3) 
Taking the derivative of (3) with respect to x and evaluating at x* noting that 
1 *) x ( V = ′  and simplifying gives 
0
) W V (













           (4) 
Let 
 
ˆ  x  = arg max S1(x). This is the asset-owner’s optimal level of investment 
when property rights are incomplete.
10
 
ˆ  x   Then (4) implies that   < x*. Hence there is 
underinvestment when property rights are incomplete.  
The underinvestment result holds if the contest is an all-pay auction. The proof is 
straightforward. Suppose V(x) > W(x) for all x. Then, as shown by Hillman and Riley 
(1989) and Baye et al. (1996), the owner’s expected payoff in a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium in the contest is V(x) − W(x). Therefore, he will choose x to maximize  
V(x) − W(x) − x. Then given 
 
′  W (x)> 0, it is easy to show that the owner will choose  
x < x*. If V(x) ≤ W(x) for all x, then the owner’s equilibrium payoff in the contest is 
zero. Therefore, his optimal investment is zero.
11
                                                 
10 I assume that the second-order condition for a local maximum holds. If W(x) = βV(x), then  
S1(x) = V(x)/(1 + β) − x, where β is a positive parameter. Clearly, in this case, the optimal investment is an 
interior solution and is a unique global maximum. 
11 Note that even if V(x) > W(x) for all or V(x) ≤ W(x) for all x does not hold, the underinvestment result 
will still hold because in stage 1, the asset owner knows that any x chosen will give a payoff of either zero 
or V(x) – W(x) in stage 2. 
  
The analysis gives the following proposition:   11 
Proposition 1: In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the finite-period investment-cum-
contest game the owner’s level of investment in the asset when property rights are 
incomplete will be smaller than his level of investment when property rights are 
complete. 
  Proposition 1 is robust to changing the timing of moves in the contest or the use 
of the generalized Tullock contest success function (e.g., see  Konrad (2009) for a 
discussion of this function). It is consistent with the results of Allen (2002), Konrad  
(2002), Gonzalez (2005) and the other papers cited in section 1.
12
                                                 
12 Proposition 1 also holds if investment and effort decisions are made simultaneously. To make a different 
point, suppose V(0) = W(0) > 0. This may be the case because the asset (e.g., a piece of land for grazing) 
may have value even if it is not maintained. Then if W(x) rises sufficiently faster than V(x), we can show 
that the asset owner will choose x = 0 even if investment is costless. That is, S1(0) > S1(x) + x for x > 0. 
 
 
3. Infinitely-repeated interaction and incomplete property rights 
  Consider an infinitely-repeated version of the model in section 2. Without loss of 
generality, suppose W(x) = V(x). In each period, the asset owner makes an investment 
choice and then possibly engages in a contest with the encroacher. I shall show that there 
can be overinvestment in this environment.  
  Suppose the encroacher and the asset owner decide to negotiate a self-enforcing 
peaceful agreement. In each period, the asset owner will give the encroacher an upfront 
transfer. In return, the encroacher will not challenge the property rights of the asset 
owner. Since in the benchmark game in section 2, the asset owner chooses his investment 
before the contest over property rights, I maintain consistency in the timing of moves by 
assuming that the asset owner chooses his investment before the parties bargain over the 
size of the transfer.   12 
Suppose that the asset owner can commit to an agreement but the encroacher  
cannot. Commitment by the asset owner is plausible because he has to honor his side of 
the agreement first (i.e., make an upfront transfer to the encroacher) before the 
encroacher honors his side of the agreement. In other words, the asset owner cannot 
betray the encroacher in any period. This is also the case in Greif (1993, 1994) where 
merchants cannot cheat but their agents can. Hence, in Greif (1993, 1994), only the 
merchants have a punishment strategy and he refers to this as a one-sided prisoner’s 
dilemma game in Grief (1994).  In my case, only the asset owner has a punishment 
strategy. 
 The asset owner uses a Nash reversion strategy (trigger strategy) where he 
punishes the encroacher by reverting to the Nash equilibrium play forever if the  
encroacher reneges on the agreement.
13 ) 1 , 0 [ ∈ δ  Let   be the encroacher’s discount factor. 
  The timing of actions is as follows. In each period: 
(i)  The asset owner chooses the level of investment, x, 
(ii)  The asset owner and the encroacher bargain over the size of a transfer from the 
asset owner to the encroacher. 
(iii)  If they agree on the transfer, the asset owner gives the transfer to the encroacher 
and the encroacher agrees not to challenge the property rights of the asset owner. 
And if the encroacher does not renege, the game ends and the sequence of actions 
                                                 
13For a recent and interesting analysis using a Nash reversion strategy, see Conconi and Sahuguet (2009). It 
is well known that the strategies in Abreu (1986, 1988) can sustain cooperation in cases where a Nash 
reversion strategy fails to do so. However, using a Nash reversion strategy is sufficient to prove that there 
could be overinvestment.  As will be shown below, what matters is not the value of the critical discount 
factor but whether it is decreasing in the level of investment.   13 
is repeated in the next period.
14
(iv)   If there is no agreement in (iii), there is a contest over control of the asset. 
Thereafter, we are back to (i) and the sequence of actions is repeated in the next 
period. 
 
3.1 Equilibrium analysis  
I want to construct a cooperative (no-conflict) subgame perfect equilibrium, so I 
solve the game backwards beginning in stage (iii) in the sequence of actions such that the 
parties agree on a transfer and the encroacher does not renege. 
  Let the transfer from the asset owner to the encroacher be 
 If the encroacher reneges, the equilibrium of the 
stage game is played forever in subsequent periods. 
Ω = C
2 S  in each period. 
Then the asset owner gets  x ) x ( V SC
1 − Ω − = . For each party to participate in a 






2 S ) x ˆ ( U S ≡ ≥                   (5)  
and  





1 − ≡ ≥ ,                 (6) 
where 
N
1 S  and 
N
2 S  are the players’ equilibrium payoffs in the stage game. 
If the encroacher reneges on the agreement, he will expend a positive but small 
effort, ε, in the contest and, given the contests success function, appropriate the entire 
asset with certainty (i.e., p2 = 1 if e2 > 0 and e1 = 0). So the encroacher’s payoff, if he  
                                                 
14 Of course, after several periods of successful bargaining agreements, a norm will develop under which 
there is no further need to bargain and the parties simply use the transfer rule used in previous periods. 
However, since bargaining is costless in my model, it really does not matter whether they bargain in every 
period.   14 
deviates, is  Ω + ε − = ) x ( V SD
2  in the current period.
15
x ˆ ) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 ) x ˆ ( S
N
1 − =
 In all subsequent periods, both 
players revert to the Nash equilibrium of the stage game, where in each period, the asset 
owner gets   and the encroacher gets  ) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 S
N
2 = . Using well-
known arguments, it can easily be shown that given that the asset owner uses a Nash 
reversion strategy, the encroacher will not deviate in any period if 
) x ( ˆ
) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 ) x ( V















≥ δ ,          (7) 
where the expression on the RHS is the limiting case as  → ε 0. 
 
Case (a): Encroacher has no bargaining power   
In this case, the asset owner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the encroacher. 
Consider an equilibrium with cooperation. Since we require δ ˆ  < 1 for (7) to hold, it 
follows that (5) must hold with strict inequality. Therefore, a necessary condition for 
cooperation is  ) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 > Ω . Next, note that if  ) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 > Ω , then δ ˆ is increasing in x. 
Therefore, if (13) holds for some x > x*, then it will necessarily hold for any x ≤ x*. 
Finally, x* = arg max [ x ) x ( V SC
1 − Ω − = ]. Hence if there is cooperation the asset owner 
will choose x ≤ x* and if there is no cooperation, he will choose x ˆ < x*. Therefore,  
overinvestment is not possible.
16
                                                 
15 I assume that the encroacher does not invest in the asset because he does not have the power to take 
investment decisions. This is consistent with the subsequent example of political patronage discussed 
below. Therefore, if the encroacher deviates and fully acquires the asset and uses it, the asset owner 
thereafter has to decide how much to invest in it in the next period. Given his Nash reversion strategy, he 
will choose the non-cooperative level of investment forever.  
 
16 Another way of proving this result is by contradiction. Consider a cooperative equilibrium with 
overinvestment. The asset owner can maintain the size of the lump-sum transfer at the same level and 
maximize his surplus at x*. This will still ensure cooperation because V(x*) is smaller than V(x) for x > x*. 





Case (b): Encroacher has some bargaining power 
Suppose instead that the encroacher and asset owner bargain over the size of the 
transfer. The bargaining game can be captured by the maximization of the generalized 
Nash bargaining product,  
M =  θ − θ − Ω − Ω − 1 N
2
N
1 )] x ( U [ )] x ( U ) x ( V [ ,  




 Then the optimal transfer solves ∂M/∂Ω = 0 and is given by Ω* = ηV(x), where  
η ≡ 0.75 – 0.5θ (0.25, 0.75) given 0 < θ < 1. In this case, the transfer is a fixed 
proportion, η, of the value of the asset. Therefore, if the encroacher has some bargaining 
power, the transfer will be an increasing function of the investment in the asset. 
Then  x ) x ( V ) x ( V SC
1 − η − =  and (7) becomes 
) x (
) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 ) x ( V ) 1 (
) x ( V
δ ≡
− η +
≥ δ               (8) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
smaller than V(x) + Ω if x > x*, so given that the encroacher does not deviate at x > x*, he would also not 
deviate from cooperation if he is given the same transfer and x* is the level of investment.  
17 Note that since x is sunk, the asset owner’s threat point in the bargaining game does not include the cost 
of investment. It is simply his payoff in the contest. Therefore bargaining, as in Anbarci et al. (2002), takes 
place in the shadow of conflict. However, notice that the asset owner’s individual rationality constraint in 
(6) is his payoff in the contest less the cost of investment. This is because to construct an equilibrium in 
which he cooperates in every period, he has to be guaranteed his payoff in the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
The same argument applies to the encroacher.   16 
In this case, δ  is decreasing in x.
 18
δ
 Then to sustain cooperation, it may be desirable to 
make  sufficiently small by choosing x > x* and also satisfy the individual rationality 
constraints in (5) and (6).  
To demonstrate the preceding point, let x ~  be the asset owner optimal level of x in 
a cooperative equilibrium. Define x** = arg max ] x ) x ( V ) x ( V S [ C
1 − η − = . Note that x** 
< x* given V′(x) > 0. Suppose x satisfies (8) with strict equality. Then  ) ( x 1 δ δ = −  and 
any x < x  violates (8) while any x ≥ x satisfies (8). Therefore, a necessary condition for 
overinvestment is x > x*. Given that  C
1 S is maximized at x**, the asset owner will like to 
choose x as close as possible to x** while satisfying (5), (6), and (8). Therefore, if x > 
x* > x** and (5) and (6) are also satisfied at x, then the optimal investment is 
) ( x x ~ 1 δ δ = = − > x*. Indeed, since (8) is satisfied at x, this implies that  ) x ( δ < 1 and 
therefore  ) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 ) x ( V > η and, for that matter, (5) is also satisfied. 
If the assumptions of the preceding paragraph hold, then we know that  δ ∂ ∂ / x ~ < 0. 
Therefore, the more patient the encroacher is, the less is the asset owner’s level of 
investment in the cooperative equilibrium. Note that we can write  δ = η δ ) , x ~ ( , where the 
LHS is decreasing in η using (8). Then given that δ  is also decreasing in x, it follows that 
when cooperation is sustained, an increase in η leads to a fall in x ~ .  
As an example, consider η= 0.3, δ = 0.8006, and W(x) = V(x) =2x
0.5. Then  
x* = 1, x ˆ = 0.0625,  0625 . 0 SN
1 = ,  and  125 . 0 SN
2 = . Let the asset owner choose x ~ = 1.5 > 
x*. Then  2146 . 0 SC
1 = ,  7348 . 0 SC
2 = , and  ) x ~ ( δ = 0.8006.  Clearly,  N
1
C
1 S S >  and 
                                                 
18 When x = 0, the critical discount factor in (8) is equal to zero which suggests that cooperation can be 
sustained. But this cannot be possible because given V(0) = 0, the constraint in (6) is violated. Hence, (8) 




2 S S > . Note that  8 . 0 ) x ( > δ 006 for  ) x ~ , 0 ( x∈ . It is easy to verify that any x > x ~ = 1.5 
gives a lower value of  x ) x ( V ) x ( V SC
1 − η − =  than at x =x ~ . Therefore, given  
δ =  ) x ~ ( δ = 0.8006, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium with overinvestment where the 
optimal investment is x ~ = 1.5 > x* = 1.  
 Note that while overinvestment can be used to induce cooperation, it is not 
necessarily the case that cooperation requires overinvestment. It is possible to construct a 
cooperative equilibrium with underinvestment, even if the transfer depends on 
investment. However, overinvestment can only occur in a cooperative equilibrium while 
underinvestment can occur in either a cooperative or a non-cooperative equilibrium. 
Therefore, in the model, a cooperative equilibrium is necessary for overinvestment while 
it is not for underinvestment.     
  An important remark is in order. Notice that the asset owner could have chosen x* 
and given the encroacher a lump-sum transfer of  ) x ~ ( V
~
η = Ω . This would give  
*) x ( ˆ ) x ~ ( δ > δ = δ , make the asset owner better off, and make the encroacher no worse off, 
where using (7) and (8) 
) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 ) x ~ ( V *) x ( V
*) x ( V
*) x ( ˆ
− η +
= δ ,             (7a) 
) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 ) x ~ ( V ) x ~ ( V
) x ~ ( V
) x ~ (
− η +
= δ ,              (8a) 
and  
) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0
~
) x ~ ( V > Ω ≡ η . 
By breaking the link between the transfer to the encroacher and investment, it is 
clear that overinvestment is not possible. Therefore, to restore the overinvestment result   18 
we need to argue that breaking the link between the transfer and investment is not 
possible. Notice that by arguing that the asset owner could have given the encroacher a 
lump-sum transfer of  ) x ~ ( V
~
η = Ω , we were making the implicit assumption that we were 
back to the case where the asset owner could make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Yet, if the 
asset owner had this power, he will not choose  ) x ~ ( V
~
η = Ω . To see this, note that given 
*) x ( ˆ ) x ~ ( δ > δ = δ , the asset owner can sustain cooperation at x* and increase his payoff 
by choosing a transfer Ω** <  ) x ~ ( V
~
η = Ω and still satisfy  *) x ( ˆ ) x ~ ( δ ≥ δ = δ  and 
) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 * * > Ω . This means that the encroacher will be worse off. This means that the 
encroacher will prefer that the ηV(x) transfer rule is follow or will use his bargaining 
power. Therefore, the overinvestment result still holds. 
It is important to note that I am not arguing that {x*, Ω
~
} is not feasible or will 
not satisfy the parties’ individual rationality constraints. My argument is that given 
*) x ( ˆ ) x ~ ( δ > δ = δ , if the asset owner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, then there exists 
a pair {x*,  * * Ω } that strictly dominates {x*, Ω
~
} for the asset owner and satisfies the 
encroacher’s individual rationality constraints, where  Ω < Ω
~
* * .  
Even if one were to argue that the encroacher can simply ask the asset owner to 
give him  ) x ~ ( V
~
η = Ω , nothing prevents the asset owner from making a counter offer 
which is less than Ω
~
. Once we appreciate the incentive to make these offers and counter 
offers, we are back to the process of bargaining.
19
                                                 
19 Note that Nash bargaining that is used here can be derived from a Rubinstein-style alternating-offers 
bargaining game (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky, 1986). 
 Therefore, if we accept that bargaining 
is what determines the size of the transfer then we have to stick to the ηV(x) transfer rule.   19 
To argue otherwise is to argue that somehow the asset owner can make a take-it-or-leave-
it offer. 
 
3.2 Other equilibria 
It is well known that supergames have multiple equilibria. In particular, even 
without transfers, any symmetric effort,
20 ] e ~ , 0 [ ∈  e
c   can be sustained as a subgame 
perfect equilibrium, where each player exerts an effort of e1 = e2 = e
c in the contest, and 
given V(x) = W(x), ) x ( V 25 . 0 e ~ = is the Nash equilibrium effort of the stage game given 





0.5V(x) – x – e
c >  x ˆ ) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 − and the encroacher’s per-period equilibrium payoff 
is  ). x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 e ) x ( V 5 . 0 S
~ c C
2 > − =   
  In this case, the asset owner can renege on the effort level e
c that is tacitly agreed 
upon. In what follows, I assume that the asset owner can commit to an agreement. Since I 
shall later argue that the scheme with bargaining and transfers makes more sense than this 
tacit coordination case, this assumption is innocuous. Besides, one can easily allow the 
encroacher to also use a Nash reversion strategy which will induce the asset owner to 
stick to the tacitly agreed upon effort of e
c (see footnote 23). 
When e
c > 0, the conflict success function is well defined with p1 = p2 = 0.5. So it 
makes sense to assume that each party gets 50% of the value of the asset based on the 
outcome of the conflict for symmetric effort. When e
c = 0, the contest success function is 
undefined. In this case, I do not assume that the encroacher gets 0.5V(x) in equilibrium. 
Consistent with my previous analysis, I instead assume that the encroacher, through 
                                                 
20 Without loss of generality, I restrict the analysis to symmetric values of effort. There are also equilibria 
with asymmetric effort.   20 
costless bargaining, gets ηV(x) which also allows for the possibility of η = 0.5. To 
elaborate, I assume that an equilibrium without conflict (i.e., e
c = 0) is only achieved 
through bargaining which determines the transfer from the asset owner to the encroacher.  
On the other hand, if the parties “tacitly” coordinate on an equilibrium with conflict (i.e., 
e
c > 0), then bargaining, by definition, is off the table and they instead resort to conflict to 
determine the division of V(x). I shall elaborate on this below. 
Putting e
c > 0 into the encroacher’s best-response function, we know that if the 
encroacher deviates, he will choose  c c d
2 e ) x ( V e e − = . So when he deviates, his payoff  










+ − = −
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x
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sign c δ − − δ − =
∂
δ ∂
.            (10) 
Suppose e
c = e ~ . Then  0 ) x (
~





− =0 because  e ~ e ~ ) x ( V e ~ e
d
2 = − = = 
0.25V(x). Hence  x /
~
∂ δ ∂  = 0 at e
c = e ~ . It is easy to show that  x /
~
∂ δ ∂ < 0 at e
c = 0. Since 
x /
~
∂ δ ∂ is continuous in e
c, it follows that  x /
~
∂ δ ∂ < 0 for any e
c  ) e , 0 ( ∈ , where 
                                                 
21 When η = 0, the expression in (8) does not boil down to the expression in (9) with e
c = 0 because the 
expression in (8) was based on the assumption that the encroacher’s per-period payoff when e
c = 0 is equal 
to the transfer, while for (9) the encroachers gets 0.5V(x) in addition to the transfer. Therefore, based on 
my assumptions, the inequality in (9) only makes economic sense in an equilibrium when e
c > 0.    21 
e ~ e 0 ≤ < .
22 Given that the critical discount factor is decreasing in x, we can construct an 
equilibrium without transfers but with conflict (i.e., e





Therefore, the multiplicity of equilibria and the absence of bargaining/transfers do not 







Therefore, even if there is an equilibrium with conflict, there could still be 
overinvestment since the critical discount factor,  , is decreasing in x. The important 
thing to note is that in either the no-conflict or conflict case, the encroacher’s equilibrium 
payoff (i.e., ηV(x) or 0.5V(x) − e
c) is increasing in x. This is necessary for the critical 
discount factor to be inversely related to the level of investment. 
So will the parties choose bargaining or conflict? Parties that want to resolve 
conflicts do not typically negotiate on a limited but positive level of conflict (i.e., e
c > 0). 
They typically negotiate for peace (no conflict) and use transfers to induce peaceful 
behavior.
25
                                                 
22 If 
 Indeed, given that I assume that bargaining is an option and since bargaining 
obviously involves explicit communication, if the parties are going to cooperate at all, 
x /
~
∂ δ ∂ is monotonic in e
c, then  e ~ e = . Otherwise, this may not be the case. 
23 For example, suppose V(x) = W(x) = 2x
0.2. Then x* = 0.3181. There is an equilibrium with conflict and a 
unique investment level x =  x ~  = 0.4 > x* if  e
c = 0.1, and δ =  δ
~
(0.4). The asset owner’s per-period payoff 
is 0.3325 and the encroacher’s per-period payoff is 0.7325. The corresponding payoffs in the stage game 
are 0.2249 and 0.2811 respectively. Note that given the investment level of 0.4, each player will exert an 
effort of  = e ~ 0.25V(0.4) = 0.4167 > e
c = 0.1. 
24 In this case, the asset owner can deviate from equilibrium by exerting an effort greater than e
c. So the 
analysis assumes that asset owner can commit to e
c. However, allowing the encroacher to also use a Nash 
reversion strategy and noting that  x ˆ ) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 SN
1 − = , the analogue of (9) for the asset owner can be 
derived by simply subtracting  x ˆ from the denominator of (9). Hence, the asset owner’s critical discount 
factor is higher than the encroacher’s critical discount factor. This is because 
) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 S x ˆ ) x ˆ ( V 25 . 0 S N
2
N
1 = < − = , so the cost of punishment is smaller for the asset owner. However, 
his critical discount factor is also decreasing in x. 
25 Of course, actual bargaining need not be costless, as assumed in my model.    22 
then a peaceful equilibrium supported by transfers and the credible threat of punishment 
makes sense. Being a small number of people, the parties in this case are unlikely to 
engage in some kind of tacit coordination that might lead to e
c > 0. Commenting on 
Schelling’s famous idea of a focal point with reference to his example of people who had 
planned to meet in New York but forgotten to say where, Farrell and Rabin (1996, p. 
112) echo this view when they observed that “[A]lthough Schelling’s work remains 
fascinating … we find this emphasis on tacit coordination surprising, because we think 
that people in small-numbers coordination problems usually can and will talk.” The 
example of political transfers discussed below in section 4 is consistent with this 
scenario. Therefore, my contention is that case of bargaining and a no-conflict outcome 
supported by transfers is a more plausible scenario. 
It should be obvious by now that what is generally required for the 
overinvestment result is that the transfer must be an increasing function of investment. 
Bargaining is one mechanism that produces this result but as shown above it is not 
necessary mechanism. Another mechanism is a requirement that the transfer must be an 
in-kind transfer. For example, if the asset-owner can only compensate the encroacher by 
transferring a proportion of the asset after investment has taken place, then the transfer 
will also be an increasing function of investment. I describe another application in section 
3.3. 
To sum up, if the encroacher has some bargaining power over how the returns 
from the asset should be shared or, more generally, if the transfer is increasing in the 
level of investment, then overinvestment is possible.  This gives the following 
proposition:   23 
Proposition 2: If the encroacher has some bargaining power over the size of the transfer 
from the asset owner to him or, more generally, if the transfer is increasing in the level of 
investment, then in the in finite-period investment-cum-contest game, it is possible to 
construct subgame perfect equilibria with cooperation in which the owner’s level of 
investment in the asset when property rights are incomplete is greater than his level of 
investment when property rights are complete. 
In section 1, I elaborated on the intuition for the overinvestment  result in 
proposition 2. So I will not rehash it here. The reader may refer to the argument in section 
1. 
 
3.3 Further remarks 
A requirement that the transfer must be linked to the proceeds of a public project 
could make the transfer an increasing function of investment. Such transfers may be 
desirable when there are institutional constraints on the nature of transfers from the asset 
owner to the encroacher. For example, consider a politician who can only make transfers 
to those who challenge his authority by investing in pork-barrel and then bargain with  
them over the proceeds of the project in each period.
 26
                                                 
26 It is important to note that the politician considers the investment in the pork-barrel project as a cost 
although he is financing it from public coffers. When Konrad (2002) applies his model to the behavior of 
autocrats he implicitly assumes that the politician takes the cost of investment into account. A reason why 
the politician may take the cost into account may be due to the moral and expected material cost of 
wrongdoing. For example, this makes sense if his punishment should he be out of power (e.g., by people 
other than his cronies) and convicted of corruption is increasing in x. Or as in Robinson and Torvik (2005), 
he may take this cost into account simply because every dollar spent has an opportunity cost. An example 
may be the distortionary cost of taxes used to finance the project. 
 This will be consistent with the 
logic of political survival and patronage that is documented and discussed in De Mesquita 
et al. (2003). Indeed, as Coate and Morris (1995) show, it may be optimal for politicians 
to choose inefficient forms of transfers like in-kind transfers via public projects in order   24 
to disguise transfers to special interests.
27 Established norms of corruption may require 
that the politician gets a share, 1 – η, of the proceeds of the public project while his 
challengers get the rest. This is consistent with the commonly-held belief that kickbacks 
in corrupt deals are computed as some fixed proportion of government projects or 
contracts.
28 This may be the case because the value of the contract varies, so paying a 
fixed lump-sum may not make sense. However, having been a practice established over 
several years, it is not unreasonable to expect that this practice may still remain even if 
the value of contracts is expected to be constant.
29
In some cases, the politician’s main motivation may not be to make transfers to 
special interests. Again, suppose institutional constraints compel the politician to have 
surrogates who run public projects and give him his agreed-upon share of the proceeds of 
the public project.
 Therefore, the politician’s investment decision in the project is driven 
by his own pecuniary motives. For example if this is a democracy with term limits and 
the politician is in his last term, then the nature of his transfer and investment decision are 
not driven by the fear of losing power. These decisions are instead driven by the fear of 
being prosecuted after his tenure in office.
 
30
                                                 
27 Of course, there is a well-known literature which argues that in the presence of moral hazard and adverse 
selection, in-kind transfers may be efficient. 
28 For example, Aslund (2008) mentions allegations of kickbacks of 20% to 50% on major infrastructure 
projects in Russia.  
29 This is analogous to the persistence of sharecropping contracts in rural and developing countries (see, for 
example, Allen and Lueck, 1992). 
30 Technically, though, the term limit makes the interaction between the politician and his surrogates a 
finitely-repeated game. However, in a democracy without term limits or in an autocracy (as in the previous 
example), cooperation could still be sustained if the politician is re-elected or stays in power with an 
exogenous probability (see Conconi and Sahuguet, 2009, Dal Bo, 2005). This means that the last period is 
not known with certainty. And in my model, the critical discount factor will still be decreasing in x with 
such an exogenous probability of staying in power. This is what is required to get the overinvestment result.    
 This is what induces him to choose less 
transparent forms of transfers like public projects. Then reneging on the agreement means 
that his surrogates take all the proceeds from the project in a given period. The politician   25 
who has the exclusive right on how much should be invested in each period will then 
revert to the non-cooperative level of investment which, in this case, could be the 
minimal level of level of investment in the project. The politician and his surrogates will 
get nothing or a very small payoff relative to the payoff in the cooperative equilibrium.
31
) x ( V ) x ( V ) 1 ( ) x ( V SD
2 = η − + η =
 
As in the previous case, the politician has incomplete economic rights over the project.   
In the above example, one may argue that when the politician’s challengers 
deviate they get   not  ) x ( V ) 1 ( SD
2 η + = . Then the 
critical discount factor is  ] S ) x ( V /[ ) x ( V ) 1 ( ) x ( N
2 − η − = δ . However, it is still possible to 
construct equilibria with overinvestment. This is because the crucial condition that the 
critical discount factor,  ) x ( δ , is decreasing in x still holds. 
 
4. Further discussion of results 
The argument that overinvestment facilitates cooperation by increasing the 
transfer to the encroacher will not be applicable to the example of the overinvestment 
undertaken by squatters discussed in section 1. However, as discussed in section 3.3, it is 
consistent with the use of public projects by politicians as transfers aimed at holding on 
to political power in autocracies and democracies or as a way of transferring resources to 
themselves.  
Unlike Robinson and Torvik (2005), it is not crucial for my result that the project 
must yield a negative social surplus for the politician to invest in it. In my model, the 
private benefit to the politician, (1 – η)V(x) must be sufficiently greater than the cost, x 
                                                 
31 Generally, what matters for the analysis is that the one-period payoff from deviating from the cooperative 
equilibrium outweighs the payoff in the cooperative equilibrium which, in turn, outweighs the payoff in the 
Nash equilibrium.   26 
(i.e.,  ) S S N
1
C
1 ≥ . Therefore, in an equilibrium with overinvestment, V(x ~ ) – x ~  is 
sufficiently greater than zero. Hence, the politician may overinvest in the project even if 
he takes the cost into account. However, given that the interest of the rest of society is 
ignored, this situation may be consistent with either a negative social surplus. Therefore, 
my analysis is not inconsistent with the construction of white elephants (i.e., projects with 
negative social surplus).
32
While the analysis leading to proposition 1 demonstrates that there is 
underinvestment in both the imperfectly discriminating contest and all-pay auction, the 
fact that investment in the all-pay auction is necessarily zero when the encroacher has a 
higher valuation but is positive when the contest is imperfectly discriminating deserves a 
further remark in terms of the intuition behind this difference in results. If the 
competition over property rights is extremely sensitive to the efforts of the contestants 
 However, because the asset-owner in my model (i.e., the 
politician in this case) does not deliberately invest in a project with a negative social 
surplus, I cannot claim that my model explains the phenomenon of white elephants in 
Robinson and Torvik (2005). 
In the case of an all-pay auction, we showed that the asset owner’s investment is 
zero if the encroacher has a higher valuation than the asset owner. This zero investment is 
consistent with Smith’s (2002) condition that for a high valued asset to exist in the public 
domain (i.e., a neglected, ill-maintained asset which tends to be common property) the 
encroacher must value the asset more at high values than does the owner. While Smith’s 
(2002) intuition is correct, I have shown that his conclusion also depends on the nature of 
competition over property rights.  
                                                 
32 Of course, if the politician and his cronies are included in social welfare, then social surplus is 
necessarily positive in my model.   27 
(e.g., all-pay auction), the battle over property rights is more likely to be very fierce. In 
addition, if the encroacher is stronger (i.e., has a higher valuation), then the asset owner 
has the incentive to minimize this extremely fierce battle by significantly reducing the 
value of the asset.  
5. Conclusion 
Contrary to standard results in the recent literature on investment and property 
rights, I have shown it is possible for an asset-owner to overinvest in the asset when 
property rights are incomplete. As noted in the introduction, the idea that transfers or 
redistribution can be used to induce cooperation, when property rights are incomplete, is 
not new.
 The new result here is that the nature of transfers can lead to overinvestment. 
The result of this paper does not necessarily mean that incomplete property rights 
are desirable because they boost investment. Like underinvestment, overinvestment also 
leads to a welfare loss relative to the first-best case of complete property rights. The goal 
of social policy ought to be the enhancement of property rights taking into account the 
cost of establishing such enhanced property rights. Of course, I do not mean the 
enhancement of the property rights of corrupt politicians.   28 
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